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Economists often describe individual bank portfolio behavior and char-
acterize it by utilizing statistics computed from bank data averaged over -the
entire banking system. Since the banking system contains very small banks, as well
as very large banks, statements about the average bank may well represent neither
the small nor the large bank 51tuation. In such a case, theorizing about bank
portfoHo behavior based on these aggregates could leave economists with a theory
describing a nonexistent constituency.
In order to investigate whether or not the aggregate data measuring
bank portfolio behavior accurately describe large as we1l as small bank behavior,
cross-section data from the Federal Reserve System
1s Call Reports for
approximately 15,000 insured commercial banks are examined from June 1969 to
September 1978. The portfolio statistics utilized in this study include the ratio of
loans, securities, and Federal funds to total loans and investments.
The main result of this study is that the aggregate portfolio statistics
are not adequate to proxy the state of the microbanking environment due to the
diversity of the banking industry. Although the construction of the aggregate
portfolio statistics gives large weight to the largest banks, the levels of aggregate
portfolio ratios are not even representative of the largest banks. Moreover, the
movements of these aggregate ratios are not generally representative of the
portfolio adjustment taking place in the banking system over the business cycle.
* Financial Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. I would like to
thank Brian R. McKee, Karen J. Harmeyer, and Carol A. Bell for computer,
research, and secretarial assistance, respectively. Helpful comments on an earlier
draft were received from my colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas;
Dale K. Osborne provided further criticisms of a later draft. That I may not have
taken all the good advice is, of course, my own responsibility.2
The General Level of Portfolio Ratios
Aggregate portfolio data are usefuJ summaries of individual banks if all
banks are sufficiently similar. Table 1 through Table 3 display the percentage
portfolio allocations between loans, securities, and Federal (Fed) funds.l/ As can
be seen, the allocations in each deposit category are sometimes quite different
from the total all bank averages.
The data suggest that as banks increase in deposit size, the allocation
of earning assets to the loan category increases (Table 1). Most banks have less
proportionately in loans than the aggregate loan percentage indicates. In 1969
banks with total deposits of at least $2 but less than $5 million had a loan
allocation 25 percent less than the all bank percentage.
With respect to the investment of earning assets in securities (Table 2),
the percentage declines· as bank deposit size increases. The deposit categories for
the smaller banks tended to have proportionately more in securities than the all
bank aggregate, while the deposit categories for the larger banks tended to invest
proportionately less. In 1969 banks with at least $2 but less than $5 million in
deposits invested over 4-0 percent more in securities than indicated by the all bank
security percentage.
The pattern of investments in Fed funds displays a much less
predictable pattern (Table 3). While one might expect that the percentage falls as
bank size increases (due to the notion that small banks tlupstream" their funds to
the larger banks where the funds are invested), this is not the case. In the late
1960's and early 1970's, the Fed funds percentage fell as bank size increased until
deposits equalled or exceeded $100 million but were less than $300 million. Beyond
that point the Fed funds percentage increased until bank size reached $1,000
million. For banks with deposits in excess of $1,000 million, the ratio declined to3
its lowest value. This pattern has changed somewhat in the late 1970's (see the last
column in Table 3). Banks with deposits greater than or equal to $25 million and
less than $100 million allocate the least amount of funds to Fed funds investment,
while banks which are smaller and larger allocate more percentage-wise to that
category.
Are the observed differences "significant?" The answer obviously
depends on what is deemed significant. We cannot appropriately use the concept of
statistical significance here because we have the entire population of banks, not a
sample of them. Nevertheless, because many people tend to identify as significant
differences only those that are stat.istically so, it is natural to wonder how the
observed differences compare to those that would be considered statisticaUy
significant if we were dealing with a sample.
Let us proceed, therefore, as if the data were a sample and "test", for
example, whether the observed difference between the aU bank loan percentage
and the loan percentage in banks with deposits of a particular size is significantly
different from zero. Because there are three portfolio percentages and ten deposit
categories, there are 30 such tests. If we find that the observed differences are
"statistically insignificant" in every case, we wi11 consider the all bank data
sufficiently representative and will cease to worry about the information lost in
the aggregation. On the other hand, if we find "statistically significantI'
differences, we can conclude that aggregation is apt to provide misleading
information.
In general, the average observed differences are "significantly"
different from zero at the 95-percent confidence level.~/ Table 4 contains the
differences by deposit category averaged over the period June 1969 through
September 1978. The all bank ratios communicate very little information aboutthe levels of the portfolio ratios in the individual deposit categories. Only for
banks in One deposit category (300 ~TD <500) did the portfolio ratios not
"significantly" differ from the all bank percentages.
While these results may not be surprising for the small banks, the
results for the banks with deposits equal to or greater than $500 million are
another case. Because large banks' assets are such a large part of the data base
from which the average asset percentages are derived for all commercial banks, we
might have expected that the aggregate asset percentages to proxy on average the
large bank portfolio behavior.~/ This expectation is simply not confirmed. Con-
sequently, anyone desiring to summarize bank portfolio behavior by utilizing only
aggregate portfolio percentages should be aware that the portfolio diversity in the
banking system limits the usefulness of the aggregate numbers in characterizing
individual bank portfolio behavior as represented here by the different deposit
categories.
The Cyclical Variability of the Portfolio Ratios
From the aggregate portfolio percentages of all banks, economists have
noted that the percentages tend to vary with the business cycle. For example, if
the economy is moving towards a peak in the business cyc1e, business firms need
relatively more financing than before because profit margins tend to shrink as
production facilities strain at capacity production levels. As profit margins shrink,
cash flows used to finance the production fall relative to what is needed, and
business firms seek bank loans. Despite a shrinking loan-security interest rate
differential as a business cycle peak approaches, in the aggregate banks move more
funds into the loan category relative to securities and Fed funds. Similarly, when
the economy is slowing down in a recession, banks reallocate their assets away
from loans and towards other investments.!t,/5
The aggregate loan ratio displays the procyclical behavior discussed
above (Table 0, while the aggregate security ratio displays the countercyclical
behavior discussed above (Table 2). The aggregate Federal funds ratio does not
seem to indicate any particular cyclical pattern (Table 3). Instead, there seems to
have been a secular trend towards increased Fed funds investment until the recent
period when the ratio declined.l!
Although the general level of the aggregate ratios is not informative
about the state of the portfolio in small or large bank categories, does the
movement (in percentage terms) of these aggregate ratios summarize movement of
the portfolios in the individual deposit categories? For the ten deposit ranges the
mean percentage changes between the peak-trough and trough-peak time periods
are displayed in Table 5 for all three portfolio ratios. Again, let us proceed as if
the data were a sample and "test" the hypothesis that the mean percentage change
for each of the ten deposit categories equals the percentage change for the
aggregate bank data. The t-statistics for the hypothesis being tested are in
parentheses in Table 5. For example, in the 1969-1970 period the all bank loan
percentage declined 4.85 percent while the average category decline was 3.33
percent. We can be 80 percent confident that the 1969-1970 average movement in
the ten deposit categories was "significantly" different from that amount
represented by the all bank loan data.§/
In general, movement of the aggregate loan percentage provides the
least information of the three portfolio statistics about the behavior of the loan
percentages in the ten deposit categories, while movement of the aggregate Fed
funds percentage provides relatively the most information. Interestingly, the
average category movements in all three ratios during the 1973-1975 peak-trough
period were not IIsignificantly" different from the all bank ratio movements.
However, in every other period the portfolio adjustment of at least one of the asset
ratios would have been misrepresented.Table 1
Loan Percenta.ges Over
the Business Cycle by
Deposit Category_
TOTAL DEPOSIT (TD) 12/69 (p) 12nO (T) 12n3 (p) 4n5 (T) 9n8
CATEGORY (MILLIONS)
TD < 2 50.6 51.6 1}4.1 1,8., . 51.8
2s:TD< 5 54.4 54.4 51.9 53.5 61.2
5 < TD < 10 56.4 55.6 55.1 55.1 63.5
-
10 < TD < 25 58.5 56.9 58.0 5,.2 61'.9
25 < TD < 50 62.3 59.5 61.6 59.2 65. 1 ,
-
50 < TD < 100 63.1 60.6 62.5 60.5 65.8
-
100 < TD < 300 66.4 63.6 61'.5 61.9 65.6
-
300 < TD < 500 69.9 65.5 6,.8 66.2 66.4
500 < TD < 1000 ,0.4 66.5 67.9 66.8 6,.1,
TD > 1000 ,5.8 ,0.8 ,4.4 ,4.6 73.6
TOTAL 6,.9 64.6 6,.1, 66.4 69.0Table 2
Security Percentages Over
the Business Cycle by
Deposit Category
TOTAL DEPOSIT (TD)
CATEGORY (MILLIONS) 12/69 (p) 12/70 (T) 12/73 (p) 4/75 (T) 9/78
TD < 2 45.2 43.8 31 LO 33.7 30.1
2 .::: TD < 5 h2.1 41.8 37.0 36.3 32.0
5.$TD< 10 39.8 40.3 37.0 36.6 31.4
10 .::: TD < 25 38.1 39.0 35.9 35.3 31. )~
25 ~ TD < 50 35.2 36.5 33.8 33.8 31.4
50 < TD < 100 31 '.6 35.6 32.7 33.4 31. 0
100 < TD < 300 31.6 33.1 30.1 31.7 30.7
300 < TD < 500 28.1 29.9 27.4 26.9 29.5 -
500 < TD < 1000 26.8 29.4 26.0 26.8 28.1
TD ?: 1000 22.6 26.6 21.5 21.2 21.6
TOTAL 29.8 31.9 27.6 27.8 26.8
•Table 3
Federal Funds Percentages Over
the Business Cycle by
Deposit Category
TOTAL DEPOSIT (TD) 12/69 (p) 12/70 (T) 12/73 (p) 4/75 (T) 9/78
CATEGORY (MILLIONS)
TD < 2 4.2 4.7 21.9 17.6 18.1
2 < TD < 5 3.6 3.7 11.1 10.2 6.9
5 < TD < 10 3.7 4.1 8.0 8.3 5.1 -
10 < TD < 25 3.4 4.1 6.1 7.5 3.7 -
25 < TD < 50 2.6 4.0 4.6 7.0 3.2
50 < TD < 100 2.4 3.8 4.8 6.1 3.2
100 < TD< 300 2.0 3.3 5.4 6.5 3.7
300 < TD < 500 2.0 4.6 4.8 6.9 4.1
500 < TD < 1000 2.7 4.1 6.1 6.4 4.5
TD > 1000 1.6 2.6 4.0 4.2 4.8
TOTAL 2.3 3.5 5.0 5.8 4.2Table 4
Average Difference Between




Loan Security Fed Funds Category
(millions) Percentage* Percentage Percentage
TD < 2 16.3, -6.51 -9·86
(20.69) (-1l.49) (-9.11)
2 < TD <: 5 10.68 -,.80 -2.89
(n.26) (-18.33) (-,.8,)
5 .:. TD < 10 9.02 -7.46 -1.55
(16.38) (-19.46) (-,.60)
10 < TD < 25 ,.40 -6.81 -0.59
(18.10) (-23.96) (-4.2,)
25 .:. TD < 50 5.4, -5.69 0.23
(23.83) (-35.99) (2.00)
50 .:. TD < 100 4.51 -5.05 0.55
(23.85) (-3,.95) (5.28)
100 < TD < 300 3.09 -3.29 0.20
(18.09) (-22.08) (2.68)
300 < TD < 500 0.4, -0.36 _0.12
(1.81) (-1.39) (-1.22)
500 .:. TD < 1,000 -0.72 1.23 -0.51
(-3.66) (7.43) (-3.65)
• TD :. 1,000 -6.55 6.24 0.31
(-26.17) (38.,5) (2.55)
* Amounts in parentheses are t statistics.Table 5
Mean Percentage Change of the Ten Deposit
Categories over the Business Cycle
MEAN PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
PERIOD LOANS SECURITY FED FUNDS
1969-1970 -3.33 4.47 47.24
(Peak-Trough) (1.74) (-1.48) (_0.24)
1970-1973 0.05 -11.35 92.14
(Trough-Peak) (-2.30) (1.36) (1.33)
1973-1975 -0.27 0.19 14.53
(Peak-Trough) (0.88) (-0.59) (-0.20)
1975-1978 7.45 -4.89 -31.92
(Trough-Current) (1.89) (-0.63) (-0.53)
* The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated with the value of beta
in the maintained hypothesis equal to the percentage change in the total
bank portfolio statistics for the specified period. The betas can be
obtained from the data in Tables 1-3.FOOTNOTES
1. Table 1 through Table 3 contain the proportions of funds in loans, securities,
and Fed funds for ail insured commercial banks in the United States, divided
into ten deposit ranges; the last row in each table contains the portfolio
percentage for the aggregate bank data. Except for the most recent data,
the portfolio ratios have been selected for the reporting dates closest to the
peak (P) and trough (T) months of the business cycle.
2. Based upon a two-tailed t-test, the hypothesis can be rejected with
confidence at the 99-percent level if the ItI>2.75 and at the 95-percent level
if It [22.04. -
3. The new panel of banks reporting weekly to the Federal Reserve includes 171
banks with assets of $750 million on December 31, 1977. These banks hold
approximately 49 percent of total assets in the banking system and 48
percent of total loans.
4. In an extensive study of commercial bank behavior, Wood (l) suggests that a
dynamic theory of commercial bank portfolio behavior which incorporates the
bank-customer relationship can explain these empirical regularities.
5. Of course the compostion of each deposit category has changed over the late
1960's and 1970's. The effect of inflation in the 1970's has been to push banks
into the larger deposit categories. As a result, the importance of start-up
situation banks for the portfolio statistics of banks less than $5 million in
deposits has grown. To some extent this increased proportion of start-up
situations explains the relatively large proportion of Fed funds and relatively
small proportion of loans and securities in the portfolios of banks less than $5
miHion in the 1970's.
6. Based upon a two-tailed t-test, the hypothesis can be rejected with
confidence at the 9D-percent level if the Itl2:1.81 and at the 80-percent
level if It I~1.37. Because the beta in the maintained hypothesis may
sometimes be larger than the mean being tested, it is possible that some of
the t-statistics will be negative when the mean is positive. Of course the
mean percentage change for the ten deposit categories effectively weights
smaller banks more heavily than the all bank average. If small and large
banks behave no differently over the cycle, the t-statistics should approach
zero.•
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